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Abstract Weanalyze the effects of corruption and institutional quality on the quality1
of business regulation. Our key ﬁndings indicate that corruption negatively affects the2
quality of regulation and that general institutional quality is insignificant once cor-3
ruption is controlled for. These ﬁndings hold over a number of speciﬁcations which4
include additional exogenous historical and geographic controls. The ﬁndings imply5
that policy makers can focus on curbing corruption to improve regulation, over wider6
institutional reform.7
Keywords Regulation · Economic policy · Institutional quality · Corruption8
1 Introduction9
The extent of regulation differs dramatically across countries. In some parts of the10
world, starting a business and paying taxes are costly and time-consuming exercises11
that make it difﬁcult for societies to operate efﬁciently. In other parts, efﬁcient business12
regulations contribute to economic development and prosperity. Efﬁcient regulation13
of the business environment should result in fewer bureaucratic procedures or less14
“red tape”. Consequently, well regulated business environments will impose fewer15
transaction costs on individuals and ﬁrms, allowing them to operate more efﬁciently.16
It is not only the quantity of red tape that matters, the quality of existing regulation17
can help to attract investment, as investors often use information on the state of the18
business environment to judge the expected risk and returns from investment.119
1 For a recent survey of the literature on the effects of business environments on development see Xu
(2010).
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M. Breen, R. Gillanders
There is a substantial debate in economics on the appropriate extent to which20
government should intervene to regulate economic activity. The consensus among21
most economists is that governments should regulate to address market failures.22
However, differences persist over the extent to which market failures are a prob-23
lem, with many economists arguing that excessive regulation strangles economic24
development. While the debate over the appropriate extent of regulation is ongoing,25
several authors have theorised that the key determinants of existing poor regulation26
and misgovernance, include corruption and poor institutions (Banerjee 1997; Guriev27
2004).28
We contribute to this literature by examining empirically the deep determinants29
of the quality of regulation.2 This is important because the quality of regulation30
varies significantly across countries. For example, Chad received the lowest posi-31
tion (183) on the World Bank’s global index, the ease of doing business. It is32
very difﬁcult for companies to operate in Chad’s regulatory environment: it takes33
at least 66days and 11 separate procedures to start a new business. Paying taxes34
is also very challenging: it takes at least 92 working days to prepare, ﬁle, and pay35
tax. By contrast, in Singapore—which received the highest score on the index in36
2012—it takes only three separate procedures and 3days to start a business. The37
tax system is also effective—it takes only 10 working days to prepare, ﬁle, and pay38
tax.39
While the gap between the top and the bottom of the in ex is large, there is also40
interesting variation within the OECD. Among this group of countries New Zealand41
received the top rank in 2012 followed closely by the United States.3 Greece was42
the lowest-ranked OECD member on the index, followed by Italy. Their poor perfor-43
mance within the OECD translates into average performance globally: Italy is ranked44
at 87 and Greece is ranked at 100 on the global index. In fact, many developing45
and emerging economies across world have more effective business regulations than46
Greece and Italy. Clearly, the differences in countries’ positions on the index can-47
not be explained by national income alone. We argue that it is necessary to view a48
country’s existing stock of regulation as a product of its (relatively) recent history of49
institutional quality and corruption. Our primary objective is to untangle the effects50
of each of the respective determinants of regulation. The results from our analysis51
indicate that the level of corruption is the most important determinant of the quality52
of the business environment, trumping the quality of institutions and a range of other53
indicators.54
The paper proceeds as follows. We ﬁrst examine the relationship between regu-55
lations, institutions, and corruption, discussing how both corruption and institutional56
quality could explain variation in regulatory outcomes. We then present our methods,57
data and results. The ﬁnal section concludes with a discussion of our ﬁndings and their58
relevance.59
2 This is similar in spirit to recent work on the determinants of economic growth and development, such
as Hall and Jones (1999), Acemoglu et al. (2001), Rodrik et al. (2004) and Glaeser et al. (2004).
3 In some previous years New Zealand has received the top overall score on the index.
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Corruption, institutions and regulation
2 Motivation60
Over the last few years a substantial research programme on the effects of business61
regulations has produced unambiguous ﬁndings by the standards of social science:62
the quality of regulation matters for a range of outcomes. Several authors have dem-63
onstrated the importance of good regulations for economic development and growth64
(Djankov et al. 2006; Gillanders and Whelan 2010), macroeconomic performance65
(Loayza et al. 2005), increased productivity and output (Barseghyan 2008; Aghion66
et al. 2009), entrepreneurism (Klapper et al. 2006), and trade (Freund and Bolaky67
2008). Considering the far-reaching effect of business regulations on performance,68
it is important to investigate why some countries possess effective regulation while69
others are buried under excessive red tape. Among the works that have considered this70
question, Banerjee (1997) argues that agency problems within government can cause71
poor regulation and that such problems are compounded at low levels of development72
and bureaucratic quality.73
In this section, we discuss the potential effects of both corruption and institutional74
quality on the quality of regulation in order to ground our empirical strategy in the75
existing theoretical literature. According to North (1990), institutions are “the rules of76
the game in a society”. Corruption, on the other hand, is deﬁned by the World Bank77
as “the abuse of public power for private beneﬁt”. In other words, corruption requires78
a criminal intent to subvert the rules of the game. From these simple definitions, it79
appears that institutions and corruption are distinct issues.4 One is agent-centred and80
the other is based on the most enduring aspects of society. We recognise, however,81
that in some societies corruption has become so deeply embedded in social life that82
it can be viewed as a set of social norms that co-exist alongside formal institutions.83
Nevertheless, by definition, corruption is never a legitimate act, no matter how widely84
tolerated. Consequently, it is best viewed as a strategy rather than a set of rules. And, as85
North (1990, 5) argues, it is necessary to separate the rules of the game from players’86
strategies in order to conceptualize institutions.87
2.1 Corruption and regulation88
Corruption has been identiﬁed as a determinant of capital ﬂows (Lambsdorff 2003),89
the effectiveness of the legal system (Herzfeld andWeiss 2003), and income inequality90
and poverty (Gupta et al. 2002). Apart from having a lasting and devastating effect91
on society, it can also undermine the quality of regulation through several channels.92
The ﬁrst channel is when ofﬁcials reduce the quality of regulation in order to increase93
the number of opportunities to receive bribes in the future.5 It could be argued, how-94
ever, that this channel is too indirect. An ofﬁcial acting like this might not eventually95
receive a bribe for reducing the quality of regulation, even if one was expected. In96
4 Although this simple definition is useful, there is an extensive literature on the problem of how to deﬁne
corruption. For example see Bardhan (1997).
5 Andvig and Moene (1990) present a model that illustrates the relationship between the frequency of
corruption and its profitability.
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M. Breen, R. Gillanders
this way, a good deal of corruption could easily be conﬂated with a poor institutional97
environment, one which causes ofﬁcials to reduce the quality of regulation through98
inefﬁciency or lack of resources. Nevertheless, an ofﬁcial who reduces the quality of99
regulation in anticipation of being offered a bribe still ﬁts our definition of corrup-100
tion.101
There is also a second channel—one that doesn’t overlap as much with the quality102
of institutions. It is relevant when an ofﬁcial reduces the quality of regulation after103
receiving a bribe. For example, a monopolist might bribe a government ofﬁcial to104
make it more difﬁcult for its competitors to operate in the market. A monopolist or a105
cartel might also use corruption to prevent new competitors from emerging, by brib-106
ing ofﬁcials to make it difﬁcult for new ﬁrms to enter the market. Once a government107
ofﬁcial accepts a bribe and subsequently reduces the quality of regulation, the link108
between corruption and the quality of regulation is more apparent and overlaps less109
with the quality of institutions.110
We recognise, however, that the question of how corruption affects regulation is111
not always so clear cut. Some authors have speculated that corruption could “grease112
the wheels” (Huntington 1968). Instead of harming economic activity, individuals and113
businesses are able to circumvent inefﬁcient regulations through bribes, hastening the114
process of starting a business or registering property. Even historically, some industries115
haveﬂourished amidwidespread corruption.Recent empiricalwork ismixed regarding116
this hypothesis. Aidt (2009) ﬁnds that corruption does not grease the wheels. Rather,117
expensive red tape often exists precisely to extract rents. Furthermore, corruption’s118
effects at the macroeconomic level cannot be gauged from isolated instances at the119
microeconomic level. Recent work by Guriev (2004) also supports this view. He ﬁnds120
that although some types of corruption can reduce regulation, making it easier for busi-121
ness to operate, the equilibrium level of regulation remains above the social optimum.122
On the other hand,Méon andWeill (2010) support the “grease the wheels” hypothesis,123
ﬁnding that corruption is less detrimental to efﬁciency in countries where institutions124
are less effective. Dreher and Gassebner (2011) also support this hypothesis, ﬁnding125
evidence that corruption facilitates ﬁrm entry in highly regulated economies.126
While our work is complementary to this literature, we do not make any claims127
about the growth effects of corruption or regulation. A country might grow rapidly128
under poor regulations precisely because of corruption and our argument that corrup-129
tion can reduce the quality of regulation would still hold. One relevant lesson from130
this literature, for our study at least, is that we cannot rule out the possibility that cor-131
ruption sometimes improves regulation. However, we think it is unlikely because the132
cost of bribing ofﬁcials to replace poor regulation with better regulation seems higher133
than using corrupt payments to degrade, preserve, or circumvent existing regulation.134
Corrupt ofﬁcials will hold incentives to resist this as they will lose payments in the135
future if regulation improves.136
2.2 Institutional quality and regulation137
The impact of our second variable of interest—the quality of a country’s institutions—138
is less controversial. Institutions have been identiﬁed as a leading determinant of139
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Corruption, institutions and regulation
economic development (North 1990; Rodrik et al. 2004).6 Good institutions enforce140
contracts and protect citizens against expropriation. It is plausible that they should141
also provide a more stable business environment as regulations are more frequently142
and effectively enforced. As well as producing and enforcing regulations, institutions143
perform distributive, representative, and accountability functions. When performing144
these functions well, good institutions could foster more accountability among the145
government agencies that design and enforce regulations, resulting in more socially146
optimal business regulations. Furthermore, in the presence of good institutions, interest147
groupsmay ﬁnd it more difﬁcult to lobby for regulations (or deregulation) that beneﬁts148
a narrow segment of society at the expense of the overall business environment.7149
Good institutions could also be able to resist other processes that damage regu-150
lation like regulatory capture. Pioneered in Stigler (1971), this describes a type of151
government failure where special interest groups come to control the state institutions152
that design and enforce regulations. According to Laffont and Tirole (1991), interest153
groups can inﬂuence regulation through bribes or the offer of future employment to154
the ofﬁcials and agents who enforce and design regulations. Furthermore, business155
interests can cultivate personal relationships with government ofﬁcials and can with-156
hold public criticism of their activities in exchange for favourable treatment (Laffont157
and Tirole 1991, 1091). Finally, good institutions may also be able to resist pressure158
from interest groups that lobby politicians and bureaucrats to compromise the qual-159
ity of regulation through indirect transfers such as political campaign contributions160
(Austen-Smith 1987).161
Several previous authors have investigated the effect of institutions on regulation162
and have proposed that corruption and regulation are jointly determined by the quality163
of institutions and that these factors in turn affect important economic outcomes like164
the level of a country’s GDP. In this approach, which has been termed the “hierarchy of165
institutions hypothesis”, corruption is viewed as an “intermediate product” inﬂuenced166
by institutions and inﬂuencing economic outcomes.8 Aidt and Dutta (2008) present167
a theoretical model that formalises this logic. When examining the effect of corrup-168
tion on growth, Aidt et al. (2008) ﬁnd that the quality of political institutions plays169
an important role. Méndez and Sepúlveda (2006) ﬁnd that corruption is beneﬁcial for170
economic growth at low levels of incidence and detrimental at high levels of incidence.171
Our argument that corruption and institutional quality jointly determine the quality172
of regulation is not incompatible with some of these explanations. On the one hand,173
high levels of corruption could reduce the quality of regulation when ofﬁcials change174
regulation in return for a corrupt payment or in anticipation of receiving a corrupt175
payment in the future. On the other hand, there are good reasons to believe that strong176
institutions improve the quality of regulation, both independently of corruption and177
potentially through their effect on corruption.178
6 There is still an ongoing debate over their significance in terms of growth and development, see Glaeser
et al. (2004) and Gillanders and Whelan (2010).
7 Djankov et al. (2002) ﬁnd that countries with larger, less democratic, and more interventionist govern-
ments regulate business entry more heavily, supporting the view that the quality of institutions determine
the level of regulation.
8 See Persson (2004) and Eicher and Leukert (2009).
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M. Breen, R. Gillanders
In order to support this argument with evidence we must address an important179
issue: the high likelihood of reverse causality. Corruption is potentially a cause and180
effect of the quality of regulation. In fact, Tanzi (1998) and Mauro (1998) show that181
regulation and taxation systems strongly inﬂuence corruption, while Goel and Nelson182
(2010) ﬁnd that the size and scope of government determines the level of corruption.9183
Therefore, demonstrating causality is challenging but necessary. We address this chal-184
lenge by proposing instruments that allow us to sort out the respective determinants185
of regulation.186
3 Econometric approach187
The above arguments suggest that we wish to estimate models of the following form:188
REGi = α + β1 I N STi + β2C O R Ri + ŴX i + ǫi (1)189
where REGi is a measure of country i’s regulatory quality, α is a constant, I N STi190
is measure of country i’s institutional quality, C O R Ri is a measure of country i’s191
corruption, X i contains exogenous controls and ǫi is an error term of the usual type.192
There is a high likelihood of reverse causality in Eq. 1. Countries with better regula-193
tion may have closed the door on a lot of corruption. More business friendly economic194
policies may also have a direct or indirect effect on institutional quality through the195
creation of an efﬁcient class of administrators or through a larger middle class, for196
example. Thus we utilise the following ﬁrst stage regressions:197
I N STi = κ +1DI STi +2F R ACi +3N ST ATi +X i + µi (2)198
C O R Ri = η +
1DI STi +
2F R ACi +
3N ST ATi +X i + νi (3)199
where DI STi is country i’s distance from the equator, F R ACi is the degree of ethno-200
linguistic fractionalisation in country i and N ST ATi is an indicator for how “new”201
the state is.202
Each of these should serve as a good instrument for both institutional quality and203
corruption in Eq. 1. Distance from the equator is commonly used as an instrument204
for institutional quality, the idea being that it is a good proxy for exposure to Western205
European inﬂuence.10 Ethno-linguistic fractionalisation should inﬂuence both insti-206
tutions and corruption through mechanisms such as the sense of nationhood and the207
prevalence of inter-group rivalry. Finally, the age of the state should inﬂuence institu-208
tional quality and corruption through many channels such as the time available to put209
9 Pellegrini andGerlagh (2008) provide a comprehensive overviewof the causes of corruption. Furthermore,
Goel and Nelson (2011) ﬁnd that greater educational attainment lowers corruption and judicial employment
adds to corruption. And ﬁnally, Dincer et al. (2010) illustrate the negative relationship between corruption
and the decentralization of the powers to tax and spend.
10 For example Hall and Jones (1999) and Rodrik et al. (2004).
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Corruption, institutions and regulation
formal rules of conduct in place and for the machinery of state to emerge.11 We do210
not believe that these instruments will have any role to play in determining business211
policy outside of their impact on the endogenous variables in Eq. 1.12212
4 Data213
To measure business regulations we make use of data from the World Bank’s doing214
business project. From its database we use a variable that captures the overall ease215
of doing business within a country—the ease of doing business rank. This rank was216
compiled from indicators that come from objective surveys which capture the dif-217
ﬁculty that a hypothetical standardised company would face in starting a business,218
dealing with construction permits, paying taxes, employing workers, trading across219
borders, registering property, enforcing contracts, and obtaining credit.13 The surveys220
also capture other aspects of the regulatory environment, namely the degree to which221
investors are protected and the recovery rate from business closure.222
This variable covers a far greater range of economic activity than other proxies223
for economic policy such as openness to international trade. It also has the advantage224
over other policy variables in that governments have direct control over business reg-225
ulation. Thus one could read our work more generally as examining the determinants226
of economic policy with business policies serving as a proxy for general economic227
policy. We use the most recent ranking which was created from data collected over228
the period 2008–2009.229
Some of the weaknesses of the ease of doing business rank should be acknowledged230
here. First, the underlying survey more closely reﬂects operations in the economy’s231
largest city, therefore; it may not be representative of regulation in other parts of a232
country. Second, the survey is biased towards limited liability companies and may not233
reﬂect the experience of other corporate entitles. Finally, the index tends to assume234
that ﬁrms have full information on regulation, which is not always the case. While few235
variables are free of measurement error, the World Bank’s Independent Evaluation236
Group conducted a study of the doing business indicators and found that on the whole,237
the indicators were objective and reliable although some qualiﬁcations were identi-238
ﬁed. Given the breath and scope of the indicators, objective third party evaluations,239
11 Following Acemoglu et al. (2001) we also employed settler mortality as an additional instrument. This
resulted in a much smaller sample of 57 countries. The instrument also performs poorly as it does not pass
conventional tests of robustness; however, our core result remains unchanged.
12 There is a clear difference between a state’s institutional framework (the machinery of state) and it’s
policy outcomes (very loosely, an output of that machinery). While a state’s age may affect the former, it is
unlikely to affect the latter directly.
13 Since we began this work, the ease of employing workers component has come under revision by the
World Bank and is, for the moment, no longer included in their calculations for overall ease of doing busi-
ness. We ﬁnd no meaningful difference between our results which include this component and those which
exclude it and so we opt to leave it in. The two rankings are correlated to the degree of 0.993. The main
difference is that institutional quality is significant at the 10% level in our many of our speciﬁcations when
the ease of employing workers is excluded from the overall ranking and in one case (where we include legal
origin controls) at 5%. The World Bank’s discussion of the need for revisions can be found at http://www.
doingbusiness.org/methodology/employing-workers.
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Fig. 1
and the lack of comprehensive cross-country measures of regulation, we believe that240
the doing business rank is the best available measure of regulation.241
As a proxy for the quality of a country’s institutions we use a variable measuring242
the constraints on executive power from the Polity IV dataset averaged over the period243
2000–2009.244
This variable measures “the extent of institutional constraints on the decision-mak-245
ing powers of the chief executive, whether an individual or a collective executive”246
(Marshall and Jaggers 2008). The variable captures the degree of checks and balances247
on a seven point scale from unlimited executive authority to executive parity of sub-248
ordination. Glaeser et al. (2004) argue that this a better measure of the quality of a249
country’s institutions than some other commonly used measures. Previous authors250
have employed variables that measure expropriation risk or the rule of law. Accord-251
ing to Glaeser et al., executive constraints is less prone to measure outcomes (such252
as corruption).14 Figure 1 shows that there is a relationship between the quality of253
business regulation and our preferred measure of institutional quality, though it is not254
a very strong one. It seems it is possible to have good institutions and a difﬁcult busi-255
ness environment. As a robustness check, we employ the Rule of Law variable from256
the World Bank’s Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) project as an alternative257
measure of institutional quality. All the WGI indicators we use take values between258
−2.5 and +2.5.259
14 Though they also show that it is not a perfect measure either.
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Fig. 2
For our measure of corruption we use Transparency International’s corruption per-260
ceptions index. This index measures the “perceived level of public-sector corruption261
in 180 countries and territories around the world”.15 We again average this over the262
period 2000–2009. We employ the World Bank’s WGI Control of Corruption variable263
as an alternative measure. It has been argued that the Corruption Perceptions Index264
and WGI Control of Corruption variables are the best measures of corruption cur-265
rently available, outperforming expert opinion surveys (Razaﬁndrakoto and Roubaud266
2010). Nonetheless, it is important to acknowledge some of their limitations, namely267
the likely gap between perceptions of corruption and its objective reality. Figure 2268
plots doing business rank against the Corruption Perceptions Index. We observe a269
more robust relationship than in Fig. 1. Countries with high levels of corruption (low270
scores) tend to have worse business policies.271
We have already argued above that corruption and institutional quality are con-272
ceptually distinct. The econometric issue is whether the correlation between the two273
is too high. If so, this multicollinearity will mean that our regressions cannot isolate274
the effects that we are interested in. In practice, the correlation between our preferred275
measures is 0.55 and, as illustrated in Fig. 3, there are many countries with high levels276
of corruption and good institutions, though the reverse is not as common. Countries277
such as India, Italy, Paraguay and Singapore seem to provide us with sufﬁcient vari-278
ation. A promising avenue for further research would be to investigate the dynamics279
of the relationship between corruption, institutional quality and regulatory quality and280
15 http://www.transparency.org/policy_research/surveys_indices/cpi/2009.
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Fig. 3
why all three factors can occur in some situations and not others. When sufﬁcient data281
are available on these concepts, it will be possible to utilize long t panel data methods282
to explore these relationships.283
Our data covers 100 countries. Figures 1, 2 and 3 show that the 100 countries in our284
sample include both rich and poor countires from across the spectrum of institutional285
quality, prevalence of corruption, and ease of doing business. All additional variables286
are deﬁned in Appendix A.287
5 Determinants of ease of doing business288
5.1 Main speciﬁcations289
We begin with the simplest speciﬁcation of our model which uses our preferred mea-290
sures of institutions and corruption and no additional variables. Table 1 presents the291
results. The ﬁrst three columns of Panel A are simple OLS estimates and are likely292
to be contaminated by endogeneity. Nevertheless, they do suggest that there is some293
relationship between our regressors and the ease of doing business. All coefﬁcients294
are negatively signed as one would expect if better institutional and corruption scores295
lead to a better ranking. It is also worth noting that adding institutional quality to a296
regression that includes corruption (i.e. the move fromColumn 2 to 3) barely increases297
the R2. This indicates that corruption may be a more important factor.298
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Table 1 Key determinants of ease of doing business rank
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
OLS OLS OLS IV IV IV
Panel A: main speciﬁcations
Constant 189.481*** 182.878*** 199.124*** 259.088*** 182.780*** 209.593***
(13.012) (5.763) (8.063) (26.035) (8.124) (19.662)
Constraints on −17.852*** −4.747** −31.258*** −8.868
executive power (2.408) (1.873) (4.589) (6.276)
Corruption −20.652*** −18.637*** −20.629*** −16.015***
perceptions index (0.987) (1.237) (1.554) (3.733)
R2 0.32 0.71 0.72
Over-ID test P value 0.02 0.31 0.64
Dependent variable Constraints on Corruption
executive power perceptions index
Panel B: ﬁrst stage regressions
Constant 5.653*** 2.541***
(0.402) (0.529)
Distance to 0.025*** 0.093***
equator (0.009) (0.012)
Ethno-linguistic −0.004 −0.002
fractionalisation (0.006) (0.006)
New state −0.779*** −0.347**
(0.177) (0.167)
Adjusted R2 0.33 0.55
F statistic 27.27 47.91
The dependent variable in Panel A is the ease of doing business rank 2010. In Panel A, columns (1), (2)
and (3) contain OLS estimates and columns (4), (5) and (6) contain IV estimates. Robust standard errors in
parentheses. N = 100
*, **and ***Significance at the 10, 5 and 1% levels, respectively
Columns 4, 5 and 6 present our IV estimates. In most cases, our regressions pass299
the test of over-identifying restrictions—only when we exclude corruption in Column300
4 do we see a significant test statistic. This indicates that some of the instruments301
may be operating on the ease of doing business outside of their effect on institutional302
quality. Given that we pass the test once we include corruption, we can take this as303
initial evidence that corruption plays a role in determining the ease of doing business.304
We can see from Panel B that the ﬁrst stage ﬁts are good enough for us to dis-305
miss concerns about weak instruments. These ﬁrst stage regressions are interesting306
in their own right. As one would expect given the arguments underlying the use of307
distance from the equator as a instrument (and as others have found), countries with308
climes more suited to European colonies tend to have better institutions and lower309
levels of (perceived) corruption. Conversely, being a relatively new state has a delete-310
rious impact on institutional quality and the prevalence of corruption. It is interesting311
that ethno-linguistic fractionalisation is insignificant in both ﬁrst stage regressions—312
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corruption does not seem to be more of a problem in more fragmented societies, nor313
does institutional quality seem to be lower.314
The IV results follow a very similar pattern to that observed in the OLS results.315
Institutions play a significant role in determining the quality of business regulation316
when corruption is excluded. However, once corruption enters the speciﬁcation, insti-317
tutions are insignificant. This suggests that it is not the “rules of the game” that matter318
but the degree to which these rules are broken. The magnitude of the corruption coef-319
ﬁcient tells us that each step on the Corruption Perceptions Index tends to be worth320
approximately sixteen places in the doing business rankings.16321
This has a clear policy implication. If institutional quality in general is not a fac-322
tor, then to reform the ease of doing business it is sufﬁcient to tackle “cheaters” in a323
series of targeted reforms rather than the very difﬁcult task of wholesale institutional324
reform. That is, it is possible to have a country with high values on the ease of doing325
business index and poor institutions as long as the degree to which the rules are broken326
is curbed.327
Of course, we are not claiming that institutional quality is unimportant. Good insti-328
tutions are probably desirable for their own sake. Also, institutional quality may play329
a role in reducing corruption levels. Indeed, as is illustrated in Fig. 3, there does330
appear to be some association between low corruption and good institutions. Previous331
empirical research has shown that variation in political institutions strongly inﬂuences332
the prevalence of corruption.17 We will not pursue this any further here as it is an333
important question in its own right. Our results merely claim that once one controls334
for corruption levels, institutional quality is irrelevant with regards to the quality of335
regulation.18336
5.2 Robustness337
To see if this interesting result is robust to competing explanations and omitted vari-338
ables, we must introduce some exogenous controls. Before we do so, it is prudent to339
examine whether our results are robust to alternative measures of institutional quality340
and corruption. This is particularly necessary with regards to institutions as Figs. 1341
and 3 show that a large proportion of our sample (35%) achieve a perfect constraints342
on executive power score.343
Table 2 uses the World Bank’s Rule of Law (RL) and Control of Corruption (CC)344
measures as alternatives to our preferredmeasures. Both variables take values between345
−2.5 and+2.5 andwe use the 2008 data.19 Columns 1 and 2 of Table 2 substitute these346
in one at a time while Column 3 uses both simultaneously. Using RL as an alternative347
16 The size of the estimated coefﬁcients on corruption are very similar in our OLS and 2SLS estimates
which suggests that reverse causality is not a major concern in terms of corruption and regulation. This
lends some support to the OLS results of Aghion et al. (2010), though they examine the impact of distrust
on regulatory outcomes as opposed to perceived corruption.
17 For example Lederman et al. (2005) and Treisman (2000).
18 Including a corruption*institutions interaction term yields no evidence that the impact of corruption is
curbed (or indeed increased) in good institutional settings.
19 Similar results are obtained using the average over the 2000s.
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Table 2 Robustness I: alternative measures of institutions and corruption
(1) (2) (3)
Constant 283.448*** 138.685*** 99.401***
(107.049) (33.800) (4.548)
Rule of law 50.504 46.217
(53.919) (47.983)
Constraints on −8.172
executive power (6.558)
Control of corruption −35.353*** −90.165*
(8.284) (47.046)
Corruption −43.734*
perceptions index (24.532)
Over-ID test P value 0.41 0.69 0.55
The dependent variable is the ease of doing business rank 2010. Estimation carried out using IV. Robust
standard errors in parentheses. N = 100. The ﬁrst stage F statistics for constraints on executive power,
Corruption perceptions index, rule of law and control of corruption are 27.27, 47.91, 53.47 and 47.91,
respectively
*, **and ***Significance at the 10, 5 and 1% levels, respectively
measure of institutional quality reduces the significance of the corruption coefﬁcient348
to the 10% level.349
This drop in significancemay be due to the fact that RL contains information on per-350
ceptions of corruption.20 Using CC does not change our result or even the significance351
level. Finally, using both simultaneously reduces the significance of our main result352
to the 10% level. This drop in significance when using RL aside, these regressions353
suggest that our results are not overly dependent on the particular measure used.21354
There is also an issue as to whether the raw ease of doing business Rank is an355
acceptable left hand side econometric variable. Using a ranking means that the dif-356
ference between 20th and 30th place has the same meaning as the difference between357
150th and 160th. This need not be the case. Wer we using a ranking as an explanatory358
variable, we could allow for non-linearities by including rank2 and rank3 terms.359
To address this issue, we conduct an additional robustness check by taking the aver-360
ages over the individual rankings to obtain what we call the ease of doing business361
Score. The difference between this and the ranking is that we don’t rank the values362
after averaging over the categories. Thus, the difference between 20th and 30th in the363
rankings in terms of the score they are allocated can be different from the difference364
in the scores of the 150th and 160th ranked countries. The score takes values between365
5.2 and 157.7 with a mean of 93.8.366
Table 3 examines whether this modiﬁcation to the doing business variable changes367
our key results. Columns 1, 2 and 3 show results that are very close to those in Table 1.368
The only change is that institutional quality is significant at the 10% level, even when369
20 Part of the definition of RL is “capturing perceptions of the extent to which agents have conﬁdence in
and abide by the rules of society.” See Kaufmann et al. (2009) for a full definition and details.
21 The result also holds at 1% if we use the Polity IV measure of democracy as our measure of institutional
quality and at 10% if we use Freedom House’s Civil Liberties Index. Results available on request.
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Table 3 Robustness II: alternative measure of ease of doing business
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Constant 204.417*** 151.871*** 172.075*** 231.445*** 125.790*** 95.879***
(18.757) (5.583) (12.678) (70.193) (20.809) (3.124)
Constraints on −21.312*** −6.681* −6.237
executive power (3.317) (3.807) (4.002)
Corruption −13.941*** −10.465*** −32.205**
perceptions index (1.130) (2.343) (16.046)
Rule of law 39.921 36.227
(35.260) (30.953)
Control of corruption −23.086*** −65.859**
(5.198) (30.424)
Over-ID test P value 0.03 0.17 0.73 0.43 0.79 0.60
The dependent variable is the ease of doing business score 2010. Estimation carried out using IV. Robust
standard errors in parentheses. N = 100. The ﬁrst stage F Statistics for constraints on executive power,
corruption perceptions index, rule of law and control of corruption are 27.27, 47.91, 53.47 and 47.91,
respectively
*, **and ***Significance at the 10, 5 and 1% levels, respectively
corruption is included. The remaining columns use our alternative measures of insti-370
tutional quality and corruption and once again our core result emerges.22371
So far we have considered only two potential explanations of a good business372
environment. To have conﬁdence in the results above we must of course allow other373
potential determining factors to enter the speciﬁcation. Table 4 adds additional exog-374
enous controls to our core speciﬁcation. The ﬁrst, and most obvious, alternative we375
consider is a country’s level of economic development. Richer countries may be able376
to afford systems of regulation unavailable to poorer countries. However, it likely that377
contemporaneous, and even more recent, levels of wealth will be partly determined378
by the ease of doing business. To minimise the likelihood of endogeneity, we use379
1970 levels of GDP per capita as our measure of economic development. With notable380
exceptions, prosperity today is highly correlated with prosperity in the not too distant381
past. If we accept this argument, Column 1 shows that (historically) richer countries382
do not have a statistically different quality of business regulation and that our key383
corruption result holds.384
Another plausible determinant of the quality of regulation is the origin of a coun-385
try’s legal tradition. Previous empirical research has established a strong association386
between different legal traditions and a broad range of regulatory outcomes, including387
the protection of investors (La Porta et al. 1997, 1998), the burden of entry regula-388
tions (Djankov et al. 2002), and the regulation of labour markets (Botero et al. 2004).389
Dummy variables for French andBritish legal origin are included in Column 2. Both of390
these variables are insignificant (though of expected sign) and the corruption variable391
maintains its significance. In Column 3, we examine whether a socialist history plays392
any role and ﬁnd that it does not.393
22 Though once again we see a drop in significance which is likely due to the pressence of information on
corruption in the Rule of Law variable.
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Table 4 Robustness III: additional controls
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Constant 242.184*** 225.163*** 206.625*** 218.623*** 173.083***
(51.159) (22.996) (22.124) (29.280) (32.474)
Constraints on −7.310 −12.638* −8.429 −9.179 −3.167
executive power (5.647) (6.767) (6.597) (5.951) (6.697)
Corruption −14.410*** −14.721*** −16.067*** −15.371*** −16.602***
perceptions index (5.212) (4.797) (3.753) (3.495) (5.230)
Log of 1970 GDP −5.756
per capita (7.418)
French legal origin 5.736
(14.856)
British legal origin −14.919
(13.746)
Socialist history 9.034
(10.972)
Log of area 6.683***
(2.066)
Log of population −9.655***
(3.374)
Western Europe dummy 8.762
(17.302)
Sub-Saharan Africa dummy 22.084**
(10.978)
Over-ID test P value 0.65 0.24 0.63 0.80 0.86
First stage F statistic on
Constraints on executive power 21.37 23.36 27.50 17.66 25.97
Corruption perceptions index 45.69 76.86 42.77 49.38 53.07
The dependent variable is the ease of doing business rank 2010. Estimation carried out using IV. Robust
standard errors in parentheses. N = 100
*, **and ***Significance at the 10, 5 and 1% levels, respectively
The remaining columns examine whether geography has any role to play. Column394
4 includes the logs of both population and area. Both are highly significant though395
our main result continues to hold. Larger countries tend to have less business friendly396
policies. This suggests that it is more difﬁcult to keep watch over a large area and397
perhaps some of the difﬁculty is passed onto ﬁrms. Larger populations seem to be398
good for business friendly regulation, perhaps because of economies of scale in reg-399
ulatory technology. Column 5 is an attempt to allow for “neighbourhood” effects by400
including dummies forWestern Europe and Sub-Saharan Africa. There seems to be no401
advantage to being surrounded by relatively afﬂuent neighbours, but there is a penalty402
to being surrounded by relatively poor ones. Once again our main result holds.403
5.3 Sample splits404
The previous section gives s conﬁdence that, in general, corruption is the key determi-405
nant of good business regulation. In this section we extend the analysis by considering406
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whether the effects are different in groups of countries deﬁned by three fundamental407
characteristics: the level of economic development, the type of regime and the sta-408
bility and level of violence in the state. While we could include these as additional409
regressors, we would require additional instruments to do so. Although splitting the410
sample is sub-optimal (especially in a macro exercise where samples are small to411
begin with), we believe that the previous section has demonstrated the robustness of412
our main ﬁnding. This extension is therefore justiﬁable, though the results should be413
taken as indicative rather than conclusive. This need for caution is underlined by the414
unsatisfactory ﬁrst stage F statistics that we obtain for most of these regressi ns.415
Columns 1 and 2 of Table 5 split the sample along the lines of economic develop-416
ment. The sample used in Column 1 is comprised of high income and upper-middle417
income countries, as deﬁned by the World Bank, and Column 2 of the remainder. The418
impact of corruption on policy is roughly twice as big in poorer countries relative to419
richer countries. Bearing in mind the limitations of this approach, this reinforces the420
positive policy implication of our main ﬁndings: mitigating corruption can lead to big421
improvements in the quality of regulation even in the absence of institutional reform,422
especially in developing countries.423
A similar result emerges in the case of democratic versus autocratic states as can424
be seen in columns 3 and 4. We use the Polity IV measure of regime type which takes425
values between −10 (fully autocratic) and +10 (fully democratic). We take a score of426
0 as the minimum for entry to the democratic sample. Again we see a larger response427
to corruption in what to Western sensibilities would be the “bad” sample. Autocratic428
states tend towards less transparent government and political decision-making which429
leaves much more room for corruption. Furthermore, autocrats often lack the incen-430
tives to enforce anti-corruption laws, as these could undermine their ability to stay in431
power.432
The ﬁnal division is deﬁned by the World Bank’s WGI Political Stability, No Vio-433
lence (PSNV) index. Like the other WGI variables we have used, this takes values434
from −2.5 to +2.5. We somewhat arbitrarily take a value of 0 for entry into the stable435
sample. The results are striking. In more stable countries it is corruption that emerges436
as the key determinant. However, in less stable environments it is institutional quality437
that wins out. This ﬁts well with intuition: in unstable and more violent environ-438
ments, improving the rules of the game becomes more important then stopping agents439
from breaking them. While striking, even more care must be taken in this instance440
than in the other splits. PSNV is arguably a measure of institutional quality itself441
and so the ﬁnding that better institutions matter more in a sample of countries with442
bad institutions is less than surprising. Nevertheless, it does suggest some role for443
targeted interventions if our policy prescription were to be followed by development444
agencies.445
5.4 Disaggregated rankings446
We have already noted that the doing business data is rich in quality but so far we have447
neglected its impressive depth. This depth allows us to test our key result in another448
way and also introduce a more nuanced hypothesis. Both theory and common sense449
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suggest that different aspects of regulation may have different determinants. Regu-450
lation in areas with greater potential for rent extraction by ofﬁcials should be more451
driven by corruption, while those with lesser potential for rent extraction should be452
more driven by institutional quality.453
Table 6 reports the results obtained from running a race between our key variables454
on each sub-rank. Corruption emerges as the significant determinant in six out of the455
ten cases, though only at the 10% level in the case of ease of protecting investors. If456
we put starting and closing a business to one side for the moment, the remaining four457
reﬂect day to day (or at least recurring) elements of doing business. This reinforces458
our earlier claim and modiﬁes it somewhat: no matter the rules of the game, repeated459
interactions between ofﬁcials and their clients leads to worse regulation if corruption460
is prevalent. It is easy to imagine corrupt ofﬁcials inventing new regulations to extract461
more bribes from businesses.462
Starting and closing a business are one off events (in the life of a particular enter-463
prise) where there is the potential to capture relatively large rents. It is easy to imagine464
an entrepreneurwho is looking to start a business andmake somemoneybeingprepared465
to grease the palm of a corrupt ofﬁcial who can stop or delay his investment. Likewise,466
owners and creditors of failed businesses are likely prepared to give away some of the467
value of the company’s assets to expedite matters.468
In three cases we ﬁnd that institutional quality is the key determinant: ease of469
obtaining construction permits, ease of registering property and ease of getting credit.470
Interestingly, these three ﬁt the bill of business regulation the least. Each is only tangen-471
tially related to the business environment, at least compared to the sixwhere corruption472
is the key determinant. This further supports the idea that corruption requires frequent473
and repeated interaction with ofﬁcials to become detrimental to regulatory quality.474
Otherwise, it is the general framework that is key.23475
6 Conclusions476
We have presented a wide range of evidence that the quality of business regulation is477
determined by the level of corruption. Our main ﬁnding is robust to additional exoge-478
nous historical and geographic controls and alternativemeasures of themain variables.479
We extended our analysis to consider whether the causal story differs according to key480
country-characteristics, namely the level of economic development, political regime,481
and the level of stability and violence. Again, we ﬁnd that corruption determines482
the quality of regulation in all but the most volatile political environments. We also483
extended the analysis to encompass the disaggregated rankings of the doing business484
indicator. Here, our ﬁndings suggest that where there is more potential for rent extract,485
regulation is driven by corruption rather than institutional quality.486
Taken together, our ﬁndings imply that a country can have “bad” institutions and a487
good business environment as long as societal actors follow the “rules of the game”488
23 In the case of ease of employing workers, neither institutions or corruption are significant. Our prior
expectation was that institutions would be the key factor as employment is a private arrangement that for
the most part does not require the attention of state agents. It may be that employment regulation is driven
by the character of institutions (“socialist” or “capitalist”) rather than by their quality.
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no matter how bad they are in general. This implies that “top down” institutional489
reform should not be considered a “magic bullet” solution for improving the business490
environment. It also suggests that as institutions develop, policy makers should not491
assume that the business environment will also improve. Rather, policy makers should492
focus specifically on measures that target corruption such as monetary incentives, the493
provision of information, and investment in technologies that increase the costs of494
corruption.24 A prominent example of a successful “bottom up” approach to eradi-495
cating corruption comes from Uganda, where information on school capitation grants496
was disseminated through national newspapers successfully reducing the amount of497
public funds captured by local ofﬁcials (Reinikka and Svensson 2005). This is just498
one example of a successful anti-corruption program targeted at education. Similar499
programs could in principle be designed to target the business environment.500
A further lesson from our study is that policy makers should not assume that devel-501
oping countries with weak institutional environments will always be cursed with poor502
business environments. Our ﬁndings suggest that progress is still possible even under503
weak institutions. While corruption is not easy to eradicate or even curb, it is certainly504
easier to address thanwholesale institutional reform, as institutions are among themost505
durable and persistent features of any society. Another way of interpreting our ﬁndings506
depends on whether effective regulation is a good proxy for the quality of a country’s507
overall economic policy. If one were to adopt this view, a positive message emerges:508
in the absence of widespread corruption, even poor and ineffective institutions can509
produce effective economic policy decisions. States and societies are not necessarily510
a hostage of their history or institutional structures, though geography does seem to511
play some role.512
Appendix A: Data definitions and sources513
Constraints on executive power is the Polity IV measure of constraints on executive514
power averaged over the period 2000–2009. The variablemeasures “the extent of insti-515
tutional constraints on the decision-making powers of the chief executive, whether an516
individual or a collective executive” from one (no constraints) to seven. Source: Polity517
IV Dataset.518
Control of corruption is deﬁned as “capturing perceptions of the extent to which519
public power is exercised for private gain, including both petty and grand forms of cor-520
ruption, as well as ‘capture’ of the state by elites and private interests” and is measured521
on the scale −2.5 to +2.5. We use the 2008 data. Source: Kaufmann et al. (2009).522
Corruption perceptions index is deﬁned by its creators as follows: “The Corruption523
Perceptions Index. measures the perceived level of public-sector corruption in 180524
countries and territories around the world. The index is a ‘survey of surveys’, based525
24 Recent studies show that some of these alternative measures can be successful in reducing corruption.
For example, a study by Goel et al. (2012) ﬁnds that internet use can act as a corruption deterrent by
increasing corruption awareness. A broad review of anti-corruption policies by Abbink and Serra (2012)
also ﬁnds support for the use of monetary incentives, penalties (and sometimes leniency, and transparency
measures to reduce corruption).
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on 13 different expert and business surveys.” It takes values from 1 to 10. We use the526
average over 2000–2009 Source: Transparency International.527
Democracy\autocracy is measured using the Polity IV measure of regime type.528
Countries are rated from −10 (autocracy) to +10 (democracy). We use the 2008 data.529
Source: Polity IV Dataset.530
Distance to equator ismeasured as abs(Latitude)/90. Source:Hall and Jones (1999).531
Doing business rank is the rank a country has received for overall ease of doing532
business. This overall ranking is itself an average of 9 sub rankings. We use the data533
which was collected over the period June 2008 through May 2009. Source: World534
Bank doing business Dataset.535
Ethno-linguistic fractionalisation measures the probability that two random people536
from a given country will not belong to the same ethno-linguistic group. The data537
were created in the early 1960s. Source: Miklukho-Maklai Ethnological Institute at538
the Department of Geodesy and Cartography of the State Geological Committee of539
the Soviet Union.540
Legal origin X are dummies that take a value of 1 if the legal origin of the country541
is X. Source: Beck et al. (2003).542
Log of area is the natural logarithm of area in square kilometers. Source: Gallup543
et al. (1999).544
Log of population is the natural logarithm of population (in thousands) in 2007.545
Source: Heston et al. (2009).546
Log of real GDP per capita 1970 Source: Heston et al. (2009).547
New State is an indicator reﬂecting when the country in question became an inde-548
pendent entity. It takes a value of 0 if independent before 1914, 1 if between 1914 and549
1945 and 2 if between 1946 and 1989. Source: Gallup et al. (1999).550
Political stability and absence of violence is deﬁned as “capturing perceptions of551
the likelihood that the government will be destabilized or overthrown by unconstitu-552
tional or violent means, including politically-motivated violence and terrorism” and553
is measured on the scale−2.5 to +2.5. We use the 2008 data. Source: Kaufmann et al.554
(2009).555
Rule of law is deﬁned as “capturing perceptions of the extent to which agents have556
conﬁdence in and abide by the rules of society, and in particular the quality of contract557
enforcement, property rights, the police, and the courts, as well as the likelihood of558
crime and violence” and is measured on the scale−2.5 to +2.5. We use the 2008 data.559
Source: Kaufmann et al. (2009).560
Socialist history is a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if the country was under561
socialist rule for a considerable period of time from 1950 to 1995. Source: Gallup et al.562
(1999).563
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